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Revenue and Wealth Maximization in
the National Football League: The
Impact of Stadia
Matthew Brown, Mark Nagel, Chad McEvoy, Daniel Rascher

Abstract
The opening of the Palace of Auburn Hills, the
SkyDome, and Oriole Park at Camden Yards led to the
beginning of a construction boom in professional
sport. In the National Football League (NFL) alone, 26
stadiums have been built or renovated in the past 10
years. Due to the additional revenue generated by these
facilities and the NFL's current revenue sharing system,
professional football franchises are building new stadia
for economic reasons rather than to replace unusable
or unsafe facilities. The purpose of this study was to
determine if a significant difference in net revenue
change existed for NFL teams that moved into a new
facility and to determine if there was a significant
change in valuation for these franchises. The findings
indicated that new stadia significantly increase revenue
and franchise value in the NFL; therefore, the primary
goal of every firm, wealth maximization, is met for
teams after opening a new facility.

"The NFL's stadium construction and remodeling
boom can be attributed to its current revenue
sharing system, rather than immediate needs to
replace unusable or unsafe facilities."

1988 for the Detroit Pistons, the SkyDome in 1989 for
the Toronto Blue Jays, and Oriole Park at Camden
Yards in 1992 for the Baltimore Orioles sparked the
beginning of a construction boom in professional
sport not seen since the late 1960s (Greenberg & Gray,
1996). In the 1990s, teams in the major American professional sport leagues began demanding new facilities
or the remodeling of existing ones, despite the structural viability of their current homes. The Miami Heat
of the National Basketball Association (NBA) typified
this need for a new facility when they moved fi-om an
11-year-old Miami Arena to the new American Airlines
Arena in 1999.
In the National Football League (NFL), 26 stadiums
have
been built or renovated during the past 10 years.
Introduction
Nine NFL teams have plans to move into a new stadiFans of American professional sports have recently
um or actively pursue a new facility within the next
seen dramatic changes in the facilities where teams
three years, including teams like the Indianapolis Golts,
play. The opening of the Palace of Auburn Hills in
who recently renovated their current venue and are
now pursuing a new venue (Duberstein, 2002). It is
likely that within five years, few, if any, NFL facilities
Matthew T. Brown, EdD, is an associate professor in the
will exist that were built or significantly remodeled
Division of Sports Administration at Ohio University. His
before 1992. This construction and remodeling trend is
research interests are in financial management of sport
evident in continued discussions about expanding
Mark S. Nagel, EdD, is an assistant professor ofkinesiTexas Stadium or building a new facility for the Dallas
ology and health at Georgia State University. His research
Cowboys, despite their consistent rank in the top 15%
interests are primarily in sport finance and sport adminof NFL team revenues and their multiple Super Bowl
istration.
victories in the 1990s (Robinson, 1997).
ChadD. McEvoy, EdD, is an assistant professor of sport
management at Illinois State University. His research focus
is revenue generation in commercialized spectator sport
Daniel A. Rascher, PhD, is an assistant professor and
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NFL Financial Structure
The NFL's stadium construction and remodeling
boom can be attributed to its current revenue sharing
system rather than immediate needs to replace unusable or unsafe facilities. Although the NFL shares a
greater percentage of its total revenue among its teams
than the other major North American professional
sports leagues (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997;
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Gotthelf, 1998), the current financial structure of the
league has encouraged teams to expand the revenues
generated from their stadium since these income
sources are not shared. The NFL equally distributes
revenues from national broadcasting contracts
(Greenberg & Gray, 1996; Robinson, 1997) and maintains a 60-40 split of home/visitor ticket revenue,
which was recently altered to more fairly distribute
income to all teams. The NFL recently allowed teams to
become exclusive distributors of their licensed merchandise; however, only the Dallas Cowboys have
assumed control of this unshared revenue source
(Bernstein, 2001).
"CBA rules state that signing bonuses are allocated
equally over the years (a maximum of seven) of the
player's contract. Therefore, teams without the
increased revenues derived from a new facility may
not have the cash necessary to attract or retain the
league's top performing players while using CBA
rides to manipulate the salary cap to the team's
advantage."
The NFL currently shares 70% of its total proceeds
through its revenue sharing plan (Alesia, 2002). From
this shared revenue pool, each franchise received
approximately $75 million during the 2002 season
(Green Bay Packers, 2002). However, since the NFL is a
multi-billion dollar entity, the remaining 30% of
unshared revenues can result in team revenue discrepancies which, according to the NFL, exceed $50 million
(Kaplan, 2003a). The unshared 30% of league revenues
are primarily generated from stadium operations (e.g.,
naming rights deals, parking, concessions, and luxury
suites), hence the perceived need to build or remodel
facilities to maximize these revenue sources.
The salary cap created through the NFL's present
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) also encourages franchises to seek increased unshared revenues
from their facilities. Retaining current players or signing free agents with up-front signing bonuses enables
teams to circumvent (in the short term) the present
year's salary cap by allocating the bonus to fiiture
years. CBA rules governing signing bonuses state that
the cap does not include all salary paid to players in a
given season (National Football League, 1998). For
example, in 2000, a player signed a three-year contract
for $2 million per year with a $6 million signing
bonus. Although the player received $8 million in the
first year of the new contract (the $6 million signing
bonus plus the $2 million in salary), only $4 million
counted against the cap that year. CBA rules affirm
that signing bonuses are allocated equally over the
years (a maximum of seven) of the player's contract.

Therefore, teams without the increased revenues
derived from a new facility may not have the cash necessary to attract or retain the league's top performing
players while using CBA rules to apply the salary cap to
the team's advantage.
Stadium Construction
One goal of every firm is long-term wealth maximization, which is reflected in a firm's overall financial
worth or its stock price (Groppelli & Nikbakht, 2000;
Shim & Siegel, 2000). The primary determinants of a
firm's value are cash fiow, growth rate of cash flow, and
risk or uncertainty of cash flow. Although an increase
in the amount of cash flow tends to improve the value
of an asset, the value decreases if cash flow becomes
uncertain. These relationships are essential to the valuation of any asset, and the responsibility of a financial
manager is to increase cash flow while controlling for
risk (Groppelli & Nikbakht, 2000). Accordingly, the
primary concern of firms when maximizing value is to
acquire secure revenue sources (Shim & Siegel, 2000).
Owners of professional sport franchises have differing
opinions regarding expenditure or retention of revenues and the method by which to maximize yearly or
long-term profits, such as streamlining player and
operational costs versus acquiring and marketing a better on-field product (DeSchriver & Jensen, 2002).
Nevertheless, a new stadium, depending on ownership
and lease agreements, provides additional sources of
revenue and cash flow that can be employed in any
fashion an owner chooses.

NJFI

In an effort to maximize wealth through new or
refurbished facilities, NFL owners have often sought
public assistance through taxes, infrastructure
improvements, land, or other political considerations
(Badenhausen & Kump, 2001). NFL teams have argued
that financial subsidies are repaid to the citizenry by
the positive financial and psychic effects that the stadium and the team's presence have upon the local community (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rappaport &
Wilkerson, 2001). Despite economic studies (Baade,
1994; Rosentraub, 1997; Badenhausen & Kump, 2001)
disputing the benefits to the citizenry in comparison to
the incredible investment requirements (often exceeding $200 million) and growing public backlash to corporate welfare, numerous NFL teams have recently
been successful in obtaining large public subsidies for
new stadium construction; these teams include the
Denver Broncos, Detroit Lions, Tampa Bay Buccaneers,
Seattle Seahawks, and Pittsburgh Steelers.
Additionally, the NFL has created new sources of
funding to augment financial shortfalls for teams
wanting to construct a new facility. Franchises that are
unable to individually finance construction or per-
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suade the local citizens or government to provide
funding may utilize low interest loans from the NFL
G3 Fund ("It's All About," 2002). This fund became
necessary as the cost of NFL stadia rose and as the proportion of construction costs paid by the team
increased. According to Duberstein (2002), the average
cost of an NFL stadium built in the 1990s was $232
million; in the early 2000s, the cost rose to $391 million. Further, teams have paid an average of 30% of the
construction costs for a new facility since 1995 ("It's
All About," 2002).
G3 Fund guidelines and league rules stipulate that a
franchise may borrow up to $150 million from the
fund. This capital is then paid back over a 15-year period from the visitor's share of club-seat revenue
(Kaplan, 2003b). The capital available from the G3
Fund signifies the importance the NFL has placed
upon improving cash flow and acquiring new revenues
from facilities. The importance the league places on
new sources of cash flow was reinforced in 2002 when
the NFL increased the size of the available fund by
$350 million, a 75% increase over the fund's initial
amount ("It's All About," 2002).

"In an effort to maximize wealth through new
or refurbished facilities, NFL owners have often
sought public assistance through taxes, infrastructure improvements, land, or other political
considerations..."

Purpose
The purpose of this investigation was to determine if a significant difference in net revenue change
existed for NFL teams that moved into a new facility
from 1995-1999 and to determine if there was a significant change in valuation for these NFL franchises.

Methodology
Sources of Data
Until recently, the ability to analyze the impact of a
new stadium on NFL revenues and expenses was educated guesswork (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997;
Leonard, 1998). Teams were unwilling to release confidential financial records, even after claiming a significant operating loss during labor negotiations. Fans,
members of the media, and even NFL team officials
have speculated and discussed the financial adjustments that will result when teams occupy a new facility. However, the ability to accurately assess these
changes was not possible until recent litigation involving the Oakland Raiders led to the release of the 19951999 financial information for each NFL franchise

(King, 2001). Although NFL owners and other consultants disputed the accuracy of the expense and profit
portions of the report, the accuracy of revenues for
each team has not been challenged (Zimbalist, 2001).
Since the early 1990s, Financial World and Forbes
have calculated and reported the value of franchises in
the four major North American sport leagues. These
reports have often led to complaints from team officials contending that the value computed for a franchise is not accurate ("Forbes: Red Wings," 2002;
"Redskins Score Touchdown," 2002). However, it has
been suggested that franchise executives might purposefully dispute the numbers as being an overstatement of a team's financial position and value in order
to keep fans from demanding that a team spend more
on players ("Forbes: Red Wings," 2002). In addition,
maintaining financial secrecy helps prevent teams from
legitimately justifying increased ticket prices, limits on
salaries and benefits to players in collective bargaining,
and the need for public financing of new facilities. In
fact, Zimbalist has implied that the Forbes estimates
might be conservative since Forbes bases value on current sources of revenue and does not consider future
sources such as additional revenue from new luxury
suites (Alesia, 2002).
Sample
Seven NFL franchises opened new stadia during the
1995-1999 timeframe: Washington Redskins, Carolina
Panthers, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Baltimore Ravens, St.
Louis Rams, Tennessee Titans, and Cleveland Browns.
The financial information released during the Oakland
Raiders lawsuit (King, 2001) was examined to assess
the changes in local team revenue after moving into a
new facility. Valuation information for each franchise
was gathered from Financial World and Forbes magazines .
Procedures
To control for inflation, the financial data for the
seven teams and the valuation of the teams were first
converted to 2001 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index.
The financial statements released during the Oakland
Raiders' lawsuit included local and shared revenue and
expense statements for each NFL team ("NFL Team
Financial," 2001); see Figure 1 for an example. In the
court documents, local team revenue was divided into
ticket sales, local television and radio, loge boxes, concessions, advertising/parking/other, and miscellaneous.
Information on franchise values was gathered from
Financial World (1995-1997) and Forbes (1998-1999).
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Data Analysis and Results
The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test is a
nonparametric test used to measure the effect of a
treatment on pre- and post-treatment observations,
where the same subjects are measured twice (Zikmund,
2000). Using the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs SignedRanks Test, a pretest-posttest design was utilized to
measure the effect of stadium opening on local revenue
and franchise value.
The results indicated that there was a significant difference between pre-stadium opening revenue and
post-stadium opening revenue at the .05 level in the
areas of ticket sales, loge box revenue, advertising/parking/other, and total local revenue. The average increase
in total local revenue was 85%, with a 54% increase in
ticket sales, a 623% increase in loge box revenue, and a
202% increase in advertising/parking/other (see Table
1). Significant differences at the .05 level were not
found in the areas of local television and radio revenue, concessions, and miscellaneous revenue.

Washington RedsHlns Team Financial Performance. 1999

64.784
148,711

Expenses (in $l,OOOs)
Player Costs
Team Expenses
Stadium Rental
Stadium Operations
G&A
PR
Total Operating Expenses

73,207
10,068
20,367
7,553
1,518
112,713

Operating Profit (in $l,OOOs)

These data indicate that new stadia significantly
increase gross operating revenues in the NFL, with the
largest percentage increase in loge box revenue (623%).
The importance of loge boxes as a revenue source for
NFL team owners can be seen through an examination
of luxury suites in stadia/arenas based upon professional sport league. In 2000, there were 3,379 luxury
suites in the NFL. This total was 1,406 more than the
National Hockey League, the league with the second
greatest number of suites (Miller, 2001). At the team
level, FedEx Field, home of the Washington Redskins,
has 280 luxury suites. Prior to moving to FedEx Field
in 1997, the Redskins played at RFK Memorial
Stadium, a facility with no luxury suites (Duberstein,
2002).

Increase In Total Local Revenue of Teams Moving Into
New Stadia (1995 -1999)

Team
44,463
8,549
14,642
3,547
9,914
2.812
83,927

Common Revenues"
Total Revenues

Common Expenses'"

Discussion

Table f

Figure I
Revenues (in $l,OOOs)
Ticket Sales
Local TV and Radio
Loge Boxes
Concessions
Advertising/Parking/Other
Miscellaneous
Total Local Revenue

A significant difference at the .05 level was found in
firm value. The average increase in firm value was 35%
(see Table 2).

3.640

32358

'Includes National Television and Radio,
International Television, NFL Properties, Enterprises,
and Films.
••Includes League Office and Management Council
expenses.

% increase
62
77
83
134
109
NA
NA

Baltimore Ravens
Carolina Panthers
Tampa Bay Buccaneers
Tennessee Titans
Washington Redskins
Cleveland Browns'
St. Louis Rams'"
'Began play in new Cleveland Stadium in 1999
''Moved into new stadium in middle of season

Table 2
Increase In Value for Teams Moving Into New Stadia
(1995 -1999)

Team

% Increase

Baltimore Ravens
Carolina Panthers
Tampa Bay Buccaneers
Tennessee Titans
Washington Redskins
Cleveland Browns'
St. Louis Rams'"
'Expansion franchise not ranked by Financial
World or Forbes during first year of existence
'"Moved into new stadium in middle of season
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38
22
83
12
6
NA
NA

Club seating is a source of revenue that is not completely shared among NFL team owners. Again, stadia
in the NFL have a far greater number of club seats than
the remaining three major North American professional sport leagues. According to Miller (2001), NFL stadia
held 47% of all club seats for the four major professional sport leagues (228,408 club seats). Furthermore,
if one examines NFL stadia by decade built, the importance of this form of revenue to team owners is evident. For the 16 stadia built prior to 1990, the average
number of club seats per stadium is 3,961. The average
is 8,740 for those 16 stadia built in the 1990s and 2000s
(Duberstein, 2002).
This study confirms the theory that the revenue-generating power of an NFL franchise is primarily predicated upon stadium economics rather than factors
traditionally associated with market size (population,
media outlets, etc.). Prior to moving into the new stadia, the range of local revenue for the seven teams was
$27.2 million to $38.1 million. After the move to the
new stadia, the range was $42.3 million to $72.0 million (Table 3). Each of these teams generated more
local revenue than the New York Jets ($40.4 million), a
franchise located in the largest market in the United
States. It is also noteworthy that of the seven teams
opening new stadia during the timeframe of this analysis, three teams, St. Louis, Baltimore, and Tennessee,
relocated to new, smaller (by population) cities because
of the municipalities' willingness to build new facilities
for the franchises.
Further, the data indicate that new stadia significantly increased franchise value. As Table 4 depicts, the
value of each franchise increased by an average of 35%.
The 2001 value of each of these franchises was greater
than the value of the New York Jets and New York

Table 3
Local Revenue" Pre and Post Move to New Stadium (In
Millions)

Team

Pre Move

Baltimore Ravens
Carolina Panthers
Tampa Bay Buccaneers
Tennessee Titans
Washington Redskins
Cleveland Browns'*
St. Louis Rams'

$34.9
$38.1
$35.6
$27.2
$32.7

Post Move
$56.5
$67.2
$65.3
$63.6
$68.4
$72.0
$42.3

"Adjusted to 2001 dollars
""Began play in new Cleveland Stadium in 1999
"Moved into new stadium in middle of season

Giants, the two teams in the largest media market in
the US (Badenhausen & Kump, 2001).

Table 4
Team Value" Pre and Post Move to New Stadium (In Millions)

Team

Pre Move

Baltimore Ravens
Carolina Panthers
Tampa Bay Buccaneers
Tennessee Titans
Washington Redskins
Cleveland Browns'"
St. Louis Rams'

$259
NR
$206
$349
$208
NR
$178

Post Move
$357
$150
$376
$392
$221
$563
$218

'Adjusted to 2001 dollars
""Expansion franchise
'Moved into new stadium in middle of season

Conclusions
As Groppelli and Nikbakht (2000) and Shim and
Siegel (2000) noted, the primary goal of a firm is longterm wealth maximization, which is reflected in a
firm's overall financial worth. NFL owners moving
their teams into new stadia will achieve long-term
wealth maximization.
Value for an NFL franchise in a new facility is
increased as cash flow improves and the risk and
uncertainty of future cash flow diminish. Importantly,
for the teams examined in this study, unshared local
revenue increased an average of 85%. This increase in
franchise revenue coincided with an average increase in
franchise value of 35%. As a new stadium significantly
improves a franchise's revenue and value, the supposition of Shim and Siegel (2000) is upheld. The primary
concern of firms, which in this study were NFL franchises, when maximizing value is to acquire secure revenue sources or develop additional sources of unshared
revenue through a new stadium.
As the results of this study indicated, the primary
goal of the firm is met for NFL franchises when they
move into a new stadium; therefore, a team owner's
desire for a new venue is justified. In order to keep
meeting the goal of the firm, the financial managers of
NFL franchises will have to continue looking for ways
to increase cash fiow while controlling for risk.
Mahony and Howard (2001) specifically addressed
problems financial managers will face in regard to risk,
and their main concern was whether the debt will be
repaid prior to the end of the useful life of the facility.
A new stadium will significantly increase the
unshared revenue of a NFL franchise; however, a finan-
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cial manager must be aware of the costs of building the
new stadium and the risk associated with potential revenue streams. With teams presently paying a greater
percentage of stadium costs and the overall costs of
building new stadia increasing at a rate greater than
inflation, debt load could become problematic for
franchises, especially if the payment period is extended
beyond the financial life of the facility. As Mahony and
Howard (2001) noted, since the 1990s, major league
teams have spent $120 million, on average, on new
facility construction. For many of these franchises, this
has meant an annual debt obligation ranging from $15
million to $30 million per year. As a result, some or all
of the added revenue generated by a new facility may
be tied to the team's debt service.

or find new corporations to replace those choosing not
to renew in order to meet long-term debt service obligations, and renewal or sales to new corporations
could be difficult in times of economic uncertainty or
duress.
Reliance on naming rights to secure stadium funding
can also be problematic. Again, the New England
Patriots provide an example of the risk associated with
naming rights revenue. CMGI purchased the naming
rights for the Patriots' new stadium from 2000-2020
for $120 million; however, CMGI filed for bankruptcy
in February 2002 (Duberstein, 2002). Subsequently,
Gillette purchased the naming rights from 2002-2016
for $90 million; when annualized, the total averages to
$6 million per year, the same amount as the CMGI
rights deal ("Naming-rights Deals," 2002). The Patriots
"The importance of loge boxes as a revenue source will have to resell the stadium name again in 2016 to
for NFL team owners can be seen through an
completely recover the amount they were to receive
examination of luxury suites in stadia/arenas
from CMGI. The Patriots are not unique when it
based upon professional sport league. In 2000,
comes to bankruptcy and naming rights deals.
there were 3,379 luxury suites in the NFL This
Baltimore, St. Louis, and Tennessee have just renamed
total was 1,406 more than the National Hockey
their NFL stadia after original naming rights holders
League, the league with the second greatest num- filed for bankruptcy. Additionally, financially troubled
ber of suites ..."
3Com recently let their naming rights contract expire
with San Francisco.

The NFL tried to address this issue when it created
the G3 Fund. Instead of each team attempting to
secure a loan based upon its own revenue streams, the
league borrowed money using its $18.3 billion television contract as collateral; therefore, the league can
lend teams money from the fund at a lower rate than
the teams can acquire individually ("It's All About,'"
2002), resulting in smaller debt service for NFL franchises when compared to franchises in other professional sport leagues.
Despite the creation of the G3 Fund, teams in the
NFL are still increasing their financial dependence on
the corporate community (Mahony & Howard, 2001).
For example, the New England Patriots opened Gillette
Stadium, a $397 million privately financed^ facility in
2002 (Duberstein, 2002). Assuming that the Patriots
borrowed $125 million from the G3 Fund, an additional $272 million was needed to construct the stadium.
The Patriots plan to use luxury suite rentals, club seating, and stadium naming rights to secure the remaining portion of stadium debt (Munsey & Suppes, n.d.).
As Mahony and Howard (2001) indicated, this can
become challenging when revenue from luxury seating
is the primary source of income for a team's debt obligation. The Patriots plan to generate $80 million over
the first 10 years of the stadium's use from luxury seating (Munsey & Suppes, n.d.). However, once the 10year leases expire on the luxury suites at Gillette
Stadium, the Patriots must renew current suite holders

"This study confirms the theory that the revenuegenerating power of an NFL franchise is primarily
predicated upon stadium economics rather than
factors traditionally associated with market size
(population, media outlets, etc.)."

Mahony and Howard (2001) also reasoned that the
increase in debt load will result in an increase in cost to
fans, and the results of this study support this assertion. For the seven NFL franchises opening new stadia
during the timeframe of this study, the average infiation adjusted increase in ticket revenue was 54% while
the average increase in seating capacity was 14%.

Recommendations
The importance of new stadia for increasing local,
unshared revenue and firm value is evident. However,
there is a need for continued examination of the available NFL financial data. It is unknown if the increase
in local revenue and franchise value will be maintained
over time. Once initial interest in a new facility wanes
(Howard & Crompton, 2003), fans may require other
qualities from their entertainment experience to continue to attend games in person (a winning team, promotions, etc.). It is important to note that the NFL has
a capacity constraint problem, with over 95% of tickets
being sold across the league. Combined with the fact
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that the NFL regular season schedule consists of only
eight home games, the novelty effect may last longer in
the NFL than in other leagues.
In addition, despite their comprehensive revenue
sharing system currently in place, the NFL may again
need to revisit their revenue sharing plan after every
(or nearly every) team builds a new facility. Once all
teams are in a new facility, large market teams will,
more than likely, he able to maintain football income
superiority to those in small markets because market
size rather than venue amenities will begin to dictate
the amount of unshared revenues generated. Of course,
the willingness of municipalities to fund new facilities
may wane now that financial data exists indicating that
a new facility dramatically changes an individual NFL
owner's football income.

"A new stadium, as previously indicated, will
greatly increase the unshared revenue of a NFL
franchise; however, a financial manager must be
aware of the costs of building the new stadium and
the risk associated with potential revenue
streams."
A need also exists to examine the stadium effect in
other professional and collegiate sport settings. As
Greenberg and Gray (1996) stated, a facility boom has
been occurring in Major League Baseball, the National
Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League. As each league has a different economic system
dictating the financial structure of the league and its
teams, issues related to the financing of stadia and arenas in these leagues must be examined along with the
effect of new stadia and arenas on wealth maximization and franchise value within the leagues.
The model used by professional sport franchises to
fund facilities is now being incorporated by colleges
and universities as well. Although priority seating has
been used in collegiate sport for decades and facilities
have been named for prominent alumni who have
donated to the university, the use of corporate naming
rights, club seating, and luxury seating is increasing.
The Ohio State University athletic department recently
completed a $200 million renovation of Ohio Stadium
and built a $120 million basketball and hockey arena.
Debt service, paid by the athletic department, on these
two facilities and other smaller projects was $20 million in 2002 (the average NCAA Division I-A budget
was $23.3 million in 2001). The money to pay off the
debt is generated from luxury suite rentals, surcharges
on tickets, seat license fees, and club seats in both facilities (Suggs, 2002). An example of financing a portion
of these facilities can be seen through an examination

of Ohio State's Value City Arena. For the arena, naming
rights were purchased for $12.5 million and $26.9 million was raised through the sale of seat licenses (Wolf,
2002).
Finally, sport organizations must seriously compare
the benefits of a new stadium or arena to its costs prior
to entering into an agreement to build a new venue,
especially if the sport organization has to leverage its
future revenue to acquire the capital to build. Today,
few organizations (e.g., Cincinnati Bengals) have
obtained governmental support for the entire cost of
constructing a new facility. As previously noted, a team
or its owner has had to contribute on average $120
million when constructing a NFL facility. Often, the
team includes naming rights as part of its financing
portion, even though at the time it may be unclear if
the team or the municipality controls this revenue
source.
Three major factors need to be considered prior to
entering a commitment to build. First, the organization
must assess the level of financial support the community is willing to provide. It is always in the interest of a
franchise to secure as much public financing as possible, even if economic factors indicate a team could successfully finance the project privately (e.g., the San
Francisco Giants and PacBell Park). An owner considering alternatives to increase revenue can invest $30
million on player payroll or he/she can invest $120 million into a $400 million facility, from which the organization will receive nearly 100% of revenues. The owner
must realize that $30 million in payroll gets $30 million in payroll investment, whereas a $120 million
facility investment gets $400 million in overall facility
investment. Investment in payroll does not guarantee a
greater return on investment; however, data show that
a substantial capital investment in new venue construction produces a substantial return on investment in
both the short term (incremental revenue) and, more
importantly, in franchise value appreciation over time.
Second, the organization must estimate the increase
in cash flow that will occur once the facility is built.
Can enough revenue be generated by the facility in its
current market to make an organizational investment
in a new facility worthwhile? After covering debt service obligations, is there enough money left to effectively
attract quality players? If not, is the
municipality/region willing to build a new facility for
the organization so that it can remain competitive
when attempting to retain current players or attract
free agents?
Third, the organization must determine the risk
associated with the capital project. The organization
must look at long-term economic forecasts for the
market, the market's ability to support a franchise, and
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the degree to which they are leveraging their franchise
to build the venue. For example, in the National
Hockey League, the Ottawa Senators filed for bankruptcy in 2003 because debt totaling over $240 million
"... despite their comprehensive revenue sharing
system currently in place, the NFL may again need
to revisit their revenue sharing plan after every (or
nearly every) team builds a new facility. Once all
teams are in a new facility, large market teams
would more than likely be able to maintain football income superiority to those in small markets
as market size, not venue amenities, will then dictate the amount of unshared revenues generated."

depleted the resources needed to issue paychecks
(Beaudan, 2003). Included in the debt was $140 million outstanding on the team's facility, the Corel Centre
(Dupont, 2003). The Senators were also hurt financially because they play in a market of just over one million people and they pay players in U.S. dollars (as all
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organization could examine a less costly solution to
increasing venue revenue, renovation.
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